22 HEALTH AFFAIRS cial insurers. Blue Cross also enjoys a differential in many areas. More than half of the sixty-nine Blue Cross plans nationally have negotiated hospital discounts, many in the 10-20 percent range. State regulations in New York actually link Blue Cross rates to Medicaid, resulting in an average statewide discount of 30 percent.
Several arguments can be advanced to justify preferential treatment of certain payers. It may be less costly for hospitals to provide care to patients insured by particular payers, with the savings generally realized in administrative costs. A study of differential hospital reimbursement by Lewin and Associates found material cost differences among payer classes in business office, accounting, medical records, social services, nursing services, working capital, and collection/ bad debt costs. Feldman and Greenberg, after surveying the literature on the sources of the Blue Cross discount, concluded that there are not substantial differences in cost by payment source. "A discount of roughly 0 to 5 percent may be justified by financial savings." 2 It is also argued that payers who provide comprehensive coveragesometimes subsidized-reduce hospitals' bad debts and the amount of charity care they must provide. Therefore, the argument goes, these payers should not have to subsidize bad debts and charity care for any patients but their own. This leaves unanswered the question of who should pay for the uninsured.
The case against cost shifting is put bluntly by the commercial insurers. They describe the system of hospital reimbursement as preferential pricing whereby hospitals get what revenues they can from the payers over whom they have the least control-Medicare and Medicaid and many of the Blues-and demand as much as necessary from those over whom they have the most leverage-the commercial charge payers. They argue that this system defeats attempts at systemwide cost containment by giving providers no incentives to be more efficient and contain costs. According to this view, the existing system also causes large operating losses for those hospitals with few charge-paying patients, and stifles competition within the health care market by putting commercial insurers and public hospitals at a competitive disadvantage.
The response by the commercial health industry is to call for an "allpayers" policy, whereby the states enforce equitable payment rules for all patients. This is another name for mandatory price controls on hospitals, commonly referred to as state rate setting.
To date, analysis of the cost of the shift has been dominated by one theme: the cost shift is unfair and should be eliminated by enactment of an all-payers system, the euphemism for hospital price controls. This paper expands the scope of analysis of the cost-shifting issue by attempting to compare the efficiency and equity of the cost shift to several other ways whereby the private sector can cope with the Medicare/ Medicaid payment shortfall. Specifically, the cost shift is compared to three other alternatives-higher payroll taxes, higher personal income taxes, and a ceiling on the tax subsidy associated with the purchase of health insurance. The paper also offers a blueprint for reform of the health care financing system. The recommendations offered are intended to relieve underlying problems driving rapidly rising health care costs rather than merely shift the burden of such problems to the private sector.
The Cost Shift Compared To The Income and Pay roll Taxes
One way the government can finance part of the cost of Medicare or Medicaid is by not covering all costs attributable to these patients, thereby forcing hospitals to cover these costs in some other way. Cost shifting is compared here with other, more conventional financing methods. We begin by contrasting the consequences of cost shifting with reliance on an expanded payroll tax or individual income tax to raise the same amount of money. It is crucial to understand that since the care of Medicare and Medicaid patients uses socially valuable resources, the cost of this care must be borne by the rest of society, whether explicitly as when government taxes to finance the full cost, or implicitly, as when hospitals shift the uncompensated costs of subsidized patients to other patients. Therefore, an analysis of each alternative mode of finance is an important part of the policy analysis of cost shifting.
In the discussion which follows, we provide rough estimates of the effects of cost shifting as compared with two modes of tax finance. For the purpose of this analysis we suppose that the amount to be financed (the shortfall in Medicare and Medicaid payments) is $5 billion. The use of this figure, which corresponds to an estimate made by the Health Insurance Association of America, is illustrative. The analysis presented here would be the same if a somewhat higher or lower figure were used.
One crucial characteristic of any method of finance is its effect on households with different incomes. The greater the share of the total tax revenue (the $5 billion) paid by high-income households, the more the method of finance tends to equalize the distribution of economic resources across households, that is, the more "progressive" is the means of finance. We first present estimates, therefore, of the distribution of the financing burden across households. These estimates assume that households do not change their economic behavior in response to higher hospital or insurance costs (in the case of cost shifting) or higher tax rates (in the case of tax finance). Of course, in reality, households will change their economic behavior to some extent in response to changing taxes or prices in a way which creates an extra burden (called the "excess burden") of the financing method. The second section below takes up the question of this extra burden and its effect on the total financing burden levied on households of various income levels. Simple Distributional Effect. To estimate the burden on households of these three financing alternatives, consider the population of U.S. households and unrelated individuals (single persons living alone) in 1981. We can array these households by income (including as income, government transfers in cash and in kind) and divide them into quinties. Table 1 describes some important characteristics of these quintile groups. The bottom group (Quintile 1) is the lowest income group, and is characterized by small households (an average of only 1.6 persons per household) and heavy reliance on government transfers for income, especially Social Security. The top group (Quintile 5) has larger households and supplies much more labor to the market.
It is natural to assume that the burden of any additional tax revenue is distributed in the same way as the current tax burden. In other words, if the top quintile pays 60 percent of the federal individual income tax, it will pay 60 percent of the extra $5 billion needed to finance the Medicare/ Medicaid shortfall if the income tax is relied on. We assume that the scope but not the structure of the tax is changed to gather $5 billion more revenue. For the income tax, this could be accomplished by an equal percentage surcharge on the original tax payment; for the pay roll tax, a simple increase in the tax rate would be one way to raise the equivalent revenue. While a payroll tax rate increase is the option analyzed here, it would also be possible to combine a somewhat smaller rate increase with a further increase in the taxable base. This step would make this option more progressive.
Estimates of the distribution of the individual income tax and payroll tax burdens in 1981 are shown in columns one and three of Table 2 . 3 The individual income tax is clearly progressive, that is, high-income households pay a larger share of this tax than they receive in income, so the average tax rises with income. The progressivity is due both to the progressivity of rates on taxable income and to the large amount of untaxed income received by low-income households (chiefly government transfers).
Payroll taxes, such as the Social Security tax, are commonly thought to be regressive since they tax earnings at a flat rate up to an earnings ceiling; hence, workers who earn more than the ceiling amount will pay a lower fraction of their earnings in payroll taxes. Yet, since low-income households receive a lot of their income in the form of untaxed government transfers (see column three in Table l), the effective payroll tax rate is, in fact, greatest on middle-income households, not low-income households.
As Tables 1 and 2 show, Quintiles 3 and 4 pay a larger share of the payroll tax (18.2 percent and 29.4 percent) than they receive in income (16.8 percent and 23.0 percent) and, hence, pay they highest rate of payroll tax. 4 Recent payroll tax changes have raised the ceiling on taxable earnings very high relative to average earnings. Columns two and four of So urce: See Table 1   Table 2 translate the percentage share burdens of both the income and payroll taxes into dollar amounts based on the presumed need to raise $5 billion in revenue.
As for the burden of cost shifting, a natural presumption is that cost shifting raises the hospital bills of all private patients (neither Medicare nor Medicaid) by the proportionate amount required to raise $5 billion. In other words, cost shifting acts like a tax on the hospital costs of private patients. 5 This price rise will then be spread to most households (even those not using hospital services) through higher hospitalization insurance premiums. 6 The burden of this cost shifting then falls on non-Medicare and non-Medicaid households in proportion to the sum of their hospital insurance premiums and their out-of-pocket expenses. This number will not necessarily be equal to hospital costs incurred, since insurance premi- ums for households in any economic class may be different from insured hospital expenses per household in that class.
Fortunately, there are data from the National Health Care Expenditure Survey on health insurance premiums per household, including employer-paid premiums and out-of-pocket hospital expenses per person for 1977. 7 These data are broken down by family income level. By using information on family size by income quintile, one can then construct expected household payments for health insurance and out-ofpocket hospital expenses per hou sehold by income quinti1e. 8 The distribution of these expenses forms the basis for the distribution of the cost-shifting burden once two further adjustments are made.
First, one must account for the fact that the cost-shifting burden on households covered by Medicare or Medicaid is likely to be far less than the burden on uncovered households. Out-of-pocket hospital expenses and insurance premiums for households covered by Medicare and Medicaid are estimated to be 12 percent of the corresponding figures for uncovered households, that is, households whose hospital costs are not paid by Medicare or Medicaid. 9 The average expense for a typical household in any income class will then be a weighted average of the covered and uncovered households, the weights being the proportions of households in the income class that are covered and uncovered, respectively. The cost-shifting burden for each income quintile will then be proportional to its weighted average relative to the weighted average for each of the other quintiles.
The second adjustment reflects the fact that some hospital bills are unpaid and these bad debts must be covered by a sort of private cost shifting. Using estimates of bad debts as a fraction of hospital revenues, and assuming that bad debts are heavily concentrated in the lowest two income quintiles, a further burden adjustment is to reduce the burden on lower income households and to increase it on upper income households. 10 Columns five and six of Table 2 present the estimates of the costshifting burden based on an equal burden among households not receiving Medicare or Medicaid. Comparison with the burden of tax finance reveals that cost shifting places a greater burden than either the payroll tax or the individual income tax on working class and lower middle income households (Quintiles 1, 2, and 3). By contrast, the individual income tax burdens the highest income households the most. The payroll tax, currently the primary source of Medicare funding, falls somewhere between cost shifting and income taxes. Both of the adjustments made to the estimated burden of cost shifting are likely to lead to estimates of a higher burden on upper income households. Hence, it is probably safe to conclude that while high-income households pay the greatest share of the Medicare payment shortfall under any financing alternative, their 
Excess Burden of Financing Alternatives. The calculations presented above assumed no behavioral response to the taxes or higher prices required to cover the Medicare/ Medicaid shortfall. In reality, however, households may reduce their hospital usage when prices rise through cost shifting, or work less when taxes on earned income increase. This altered behavior means that the total burden of the financing alternative may exceed the revenue collected in taxes or extra hospital charges. An extra amount or "excess burden" arises from the fact that cost shifting raises hospital prices above their cost, or taxes reduce a worker's after-tax earnings below his value to his employer. The excess burden takes the form of tax revenues lost when people work less in response to higher rates of taxation. The greater the distortion of economic behavior by the tax or the higher price of hospital care, the larger the excess burden.
The excess burden of higher taxes on earnings depends on both the responsiveness of labor supply to changes in the after-tax reward to work and the current level of taxes on earnings. 11 In particular, the higher the marginal tax rate (the rate at which an extra dollar of income is taxed), the greater the excess burden, When all taxes are accounted for, the current U.S. tax system imposes marginal tax rates of between 40 and 55 percent on the earnings of the typical household. 12 Hence, the excess burden of more taxes on earned income (higher payroll or income taxes) will be significant. Research on labor supply shows that households reduce their supply of labor about 1.5 percent for every 10 percent reduction in the after-tax wage rate, yielding an elasticity of about .15. 13 Our rough estimate is that the excess burden of extra taxes amounts to 14 percent of the tax revenue collected, so that the total burden of raising taxes is about $5.7 billion: $5 billion of extra tax revenue plus an excess burden of $0.7 billion ($5 billion x 14 percent).
14 The total burden on each affected household is proportionately higher. This calculation is quite sensitive to the assumed marginal tax rates and elasticities, and could easily be twice or half the amount presented. Columns one and two in Table 3 present the total burden calculations for both income taxes and payroll taxes.
The excess burden of cost shifting can be computed in a similar way by viewing cost shifting as a tax on hospital costs. The excess burden of a tax on hospital costs will be very small, since the excess burden depends crucially on the existing level of taxes on the commodity being taxed and there are no other taxes on hospital costs. Rough calculations yield an excess burden of about $12 million, or about 0.25 percent of the revenue raised. 15 This number is very small compared with the excess burden of tax finance, and it could even be argued that the true excess burden is smaller since many economists feel that the tax exemption of employer- paid health insurance premiums leads to excess insurance and use of hospitals. 16 Though these computations are very rough, one can conclude with reasonable assurance that the excess burden of cost shifting is far less than the excess burden of tax increases, primarily because labor income is already heavily taxed and hospital costs and health insurance are very lightly taxed.
Unfortunately, one cannot make an unequivocal choice between tax finance and cost shifting to cover the Medicare/ Medicaid shortfall. Although there are bound to be many sources of error in the precise calculations presented, it is safe to argue that cost shifting places a greater share of the burden on lower-and middle-income households while direct taxation imposes the greatest to!~tal burden on all households, taken together. If the assumptions underlying the numbers in Table 3 are correct, cost shifting imposes a greater burden on the poorest 60 percent of households than either form of tax finance, even when excess burdens are added in. However, given the margins of error in these calculations, the computed burdens of payroll taxes and cost shifting on Quintiles 2 and 3 might be judged roughly similar. Payroll taxes are, of course, the most likely tax financing alternative, since the Medicare program is currently funded largely through payroll taxes.
The Cost Shift Compared To A Cap On The Amount Of EmployerPaid Health Insurance Premiums That Are Tax-Free To The Employee
In the previous section, the efficiency and equity of financing a shortfall in the federal government's reimbursement of health care providers through cost shifting was compared to two alternative financing mechanisms-increased payroll taxes and increased federal income taxes. In this section a third alternative to current policy is raised: reducing the tax subsidy associated with the purchase of health insurance and using the proceeds to increase Medicare payments on behalf of beneficiaries. It is important to note that added revenue from a tax subsidy cap could be used in other ways. Medicaid coverage, for example, could be extended to working poor families or other low-income persons categorically ineligible for Medicaid. Short-term cost increases associated with converting Medicare or Medicaid to a voucher-type program could be defrayed. The revenue, of course, could also be allowed to reduce the government deficit. The discussion here will not analyze all of these alternatives, but instead will focus on the comparative advantage of raising the money through a reduction in the chief health-related tax expenditure relative to other financing mechanisms.
The tax-free status of employer contributions to employee health insurance is estimated to drain $30.7 billion in revenues from government coffers in 1983. 17 An estimated $20.4 billion in federal income taxes would be fore one as a result of this exclusion, while payroll taxes would be $6.5 billion less and state income taxes $3.8 billion less than they would be if employer contributions were fully taxed.
18 Table 4 shows the potential revenue increases in 1983 associated with varying levels of a ceiling on this tax subsidy, as estimated by Gail Wilensky and Amy Taylor.
This table indicates that a tax subsidy "cap" of $1,800 per year for family policies ($150 per month) and $720 for individual policies would raise total government revenues by an estimated $5.2 billion in 1983. This figure is roughly equal to the estimated $5 billion in cost shifting used for illustrative purposes in the previous section. Table 5 shows that the incidence of this tax increase would fall mainly on upper income households, since most lower income households either pay no taxes or do not receive employer contributions to health insurance exceeding the cap. Table 6 shows the absolute tax burden of this tax subsidy ceiling on households in different income groups. Table  7 compares the distribution of a tax increase for three different levels of the cap.
While the incidence of a tighter tax cap would fall slightly more on the middle-income groups (that is, their share of the bill would be slightly greater) and slightly less on the upper-income groups, the alternative caps shown here are quite similar in terms of who pays the bill. Under all three options only about one-eighth of the tax increase is borne by those with annual incomes below $20,000 and nearly half of the tax increase is Table 4 paid by households in the $30,000-$50,000 income range. A rough comparison of these distributions to those presented for the cost shift in the previous section suggests that limiting the tax expenditure associated with employer contributions to health insurance would place relatively more of the burden on upper-income groups. Of course, there are good reasons for limiting this tax subsidy even if the revenue is not used to raise Medicare or Medicaid payments, as the subsidy ceiling would lead to more cost-conscious choices by employees in the selection of health care plans. The point here is that the tax cap would surely provide a very progressive alternative to the current method of "funding" the shortfall, and is also superior on efficiency grounds.
A Blueprint For Reform
As the magnitude of the cost-shifting phenomenon grows, those who cannot extract a significant "discount" from the total cost of treating their patients are likely to seek a new overlay of controls that block providers from passing the buck to them. The more cost shifting is unrestrained by such new controls, the more nongovernment bill payers will impose this hidden tax on their clients-consisting largely of the nation's employers who purchase group insurance policies for their workers. Sharply higher premiums will reduce the real income of households that consume health care and health insurance. Alternatively, the more cost shifting is restrained by new controls that limit fee or rate increases for "all payers," the greater the squeeze on provider margins and the greater the threat to the vitality and innovative impulse of the industry.
Thus, in the absence of systemwide reforms leading to actual lower costs (as opposed to an artificial supression of charges), we face this choice: side effects of cost shifting that mainly take the form of higher prices in the economy and lower real income than would otherwise be achieved versus side effects that mainly involve a process in which squeezed providers first eat their seed corn by chewing up capital budgets and reserves and then cut services or reduce their quality. As the saying goes, "You can pay me now or you can pay me later."
The real problem facing health care reformers is that as individuals we want it all; as members of society, we don't want to pay for wanting it all. Cost shifting is not the core problem itself. Rather, it is a symptom of the inherent contradiction between the citizen as patient and the citizen as taxpayer. Government is caught in the middle. There is no strong constituency for raising taxes; government program beneficiaries don't want to be denied; and, the private sector is tired of absorbing the shortfall. This is clearly an untenable situation.
In our view, health care reforms will help to resolve this contradiction if they incorporate the following features: (1) a system of sharing costs that encourages people to economize on the use of routine health services, while offering greater protection from the costs of serious illness; (2) federal aid to low-income people that increases with increasing need and vice versa; (3) fixed-dollar instead of open-ended federal subsidies to aid those unable to purchase adequate health insurance; and (4) fair competition among alternative health care plans for the consumer's dollar.
These features are based on the principles of choice, limits, and power to the patient. Instead of the "less is beautiful" mentality of the controls strategy, these principles would make consumers more aware of and accountable for the financial consequences of their decisions. The incentivesbased approach puts the consumer into the health picture again, not so much at the point of use of the system (when cost considerations understandably seem almost immaterial to the consumer), but at the point of choosing a health care plan.
Implementing the features enumerated above can be done through the following changes in government policy. Taxes. Place a ceiling on the chief open-ended tax subsidy for health care-the tax-free status of employer contributions to employee health insurance. Medicare and Medicaid. Adopt mandatory prospective payment for Medicare on a temporary, one-year basis, followed by the conversion of Medicare to a program of premium subsidies to be used for Medicare coverage or any qualified alternative plan. Build protection against expenses associated with catastrophic illness into Medicare, combined with a greater measure of cost sharing for routine services. Convert Medicaid to a system of sliding-scale premium subsidies in which the very poor would be fully subsidized. Other. Continue the process of deregulation in areas such as certificateof-need (CON) and flexibility for states under Medicaid. Use existing antitrust law to encourage fair competition among alternative health care plans and providers.
Conclusion
In deciding whether the merits of the health care reforms proposed here outweigh their limitations, it is important to understand that the status quo in health care financing, as we have known it in recent years, is an unlikely alternative. If market-oriented reforms languish, a combination of tightened federal controls on the private health care sector and benefit reductions in federal health programs is the likely consequence.
Competing national objectives will force us to make continuous alterations in the "social contract." This is not to suggest that our social contract with health care program beneficiaries should be untouchable. The vouchers proposed for Medicare, for example, represent a change in the nature of the entitlement. Instead, we argue that sensible program reforms involving defensible conversions of open-ended entitlements into limited, but still generous subsidies can obviate, to some extent, the need for sharp cuts in benefits. Given the inexorable government budget squeeze, we have a choice between a business-as-usual approach to the structure of the programs, coupled with steady reductions in their generosity, or a set of reforms that modify that structure. While there is no guarantee the reforms will succeed in bridg ing the entire gap between health care needs and available resources, if we address the reforms to the fundamental causes of the problem instead of to its symptoms, we can at least mitigate the need to renege on our past commitments.
The continuing pressure on federal social spending is likely to lead to an ever-increasing shortfall in government reimbursement of health care providers. In this paper we have evaluated alternative ways in which this shortfall can be financed.
The evidence presented here suggests that we face a dilemma in choosing between current "cost shift" financing and higher taxes or a ceiling on the tax subsidy. The cost shift approach carries a somewhat lower total price tag, when the extra burden of taxes on the economy is taken into account, but the tax-related approaches appear to be more equitable. Of the options assessed, higher personal income taxes and a ceiling on the tax subsidy associated with the purchase of health insurance place the greatest incidence of the burden of financing the shortfall on those who are best able to afford it. The tax subsidy cap has the additional positive feature of encouraging more cost consciousness and more choice in the selection of health plans by employees.
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